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1   Abstract:  Growth of the water market since the early 1990s has generated controversy in 
California’s source regions over two types of transfers – those drawing on native 
groundwater reserves and those resulting from crop idling. Given incomplete state-level 
protections for third parties who may suffer adverse effects of water sales, local 
authorities have responded with their own measures.  In particular, many rural counties 
have adopted ordinances restricting groundwater exports. Some communities have 
restricted farmers’ right to fallow land for the market.  Original data on water market 
flows and local ordinances are used to analyze the impact of county trade restrictions on 
water sales and water exports.  County ordinances have reduced water exports by 
nearly20 percent and water sales by nearly 15 percent since the mid 1990s and have 
shifted some exports to local buyers. Several policy options are available for mitigating 
third-party effects in less trade-restrictive ways. For groundwater protection, a more 
efficient solution lies in the establishment of local groundwater management systems. 
Recent test cases will provide useful guidance on the practical difficulties of 
implementing a transfer tax to compensate communities for the impacts of fallowing. 
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Water Marketing and Third-Party Impacts 
  In California, as elsewhere in the American West, the water needs of a growing 
population were met over much of the past century by investments in large reservoirs and 
conveyance systems, often with considerable public subsidies (Reisner, 1986; Wahl, 
1989).  Environmental and financial cost considerations have diminished this option over 
the past few decades, pushing policymakers to explore a range of alternatives to meet the 
demands of continued rapid growth (WWPAC, 1998).  Options include expansion of 
non-traditional sources of supply (underground storage, recycling and desalination), 
conservation, and reallocation through water marketing. 
A role for the market arises because use-rights to water have already been 
appropriated, for many decades, under the “first in time, first in right” doctrine that 
governs access to water in the West (Sax et al., 1991).  In an era when pricing has been 
advocated as a solution for a wide range of resource allocation issues, water transfers are 
1   seen as a means to accommodate the changing patterns of demand while compensating 
water rights holders – mainly agricultural users – for foregoing their own access on a 
temporary, long-term, or permanent basis. 
Not surprisingly, economists have been at the forefront in making the case for 
water markets and in promoting policies favoring their development (e.g., Hartman and 
Seastone, 1970; Phelps et al., 1978; Anderson, 1983; Vaux and Howitt, 1984).  
Nevertheless, a number of scholars have also highlighted the potential pitfalls of a market 
if it fails to shield “third parties” in the source regions from negative impacts of trading 
(Young, 1986; Howe et al., 1990; NRC, 1992; Colby, 1995).  In part, the issue is one of 
equity: if transfers result in a significant decrease in agricultural activity, some residents 
in the selling region may suffer economic losses even though the transaction enhances 
overall efficiency of resource use.  But the issue is also one of efficiency:  if the legal 
system governing transfers does not adequately protect other water rights-holders, 
transacting parties have an incentive to sell more than the optimal amount of local water, 
with adverse physical impacts on other water users. Both economic and physical impacts 
could be expected to fuel local resistance to the water market in the source regions. 
  This paper examines the effect of third-party issues on the development of 
California’s water market since the early 1990s, drawing on two original databases on 
market transactions and on local resistance in the source counties.  California provides an 
interesting setting for at least two reasons. First, by virtue of its frontline role in market 
development, the state itself is a potential generator of third-party impacts.  The state 
began promoting the water market in the late 1970s by adopting a set of facilitative 
policies; in the early 1990s it became an active and, at times, lead market participant, 
2   purchasing water for drought banks and for the environment.  This direct exposure to the 
market and the local opposition it has engendered has kept protection of third parties on 
the front burner of the state’s policy agenda. 
California is also of special interest for its legal safeguards to shield other water 
users from transfer-related harm.  The state’s “no-injury” laws for water marketing, 
which are intended to prevent unmitigated physical effects of the market on third parties, 
are more comprehensive than in many other western states, unambiguously extending to 
other legal water-rights holders as well as to environmental uses.
1  However, these laws 
technically apply only to surface water (Gould, 1988).  Groundwater accounts for as 
much as 40 percent of total supply but falls largely outside of the purview of state 
regulatory authority (CDWR, 1998; Foley-Gannon, 2000).  As a consequence, the debate 
over protecting third parties in California is intimately linked to a wider debate over the 
appropriate mechanisms for sustainable management of a common pool resource such as 
groundwater (Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1992; Provencher and Burt, 1993).  The 
implications of inadequate protections for groundwater users extend not only to water 
marketing, but also to the optimal use of groundwater banking as a means of augmenting 
supply. 
The paper begins with an overview of the development of the market and the rise 
of local resistance over the past decade.  An empirical model of water supply is then used 
to gauge the market impacts of local resistance.  This is followed by an assessment of the 
                                                 
1 The protections in some other southwestern states appear less extensive, particularly with respect to the 
environment (Colby, 1995; Howe, 2000). California’s no-injury doctrine was established through case law 
as early as 1862 (Gray, 1994a).  The environmental protections for fish, wildlife and instream beneficial 
uses were codified in Cal. Water Code § 1738 in 1980. 
3   policy options for resolving conflicts arising from the physical externalities to 
groundwater users and the pecuniary externalities associated with land fallowing. 
 
California’s Experience: Market Growth and the Rise of Local Resistance 
California’s water market got a jumpstart with the prolonged drought of the late 
1980s and early 1990s, when the state’s Department of Water Resources (CDWR) and 
the federal Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) initiated a series of dry-year purchase 
programs, including water banks in several years. The impact on sales was dramatic:  
from 1988 to the end of the drought in 1994, state and federal purchases for resale to 
local agencies and for wildlife refuges accounted for over 40 percent of a market that 
jumped from an average of 150,000 acre-feet to over 600,000 acre-feet per year (Figure 
1). 
Although the second half of the 1990s saw a succession of wet years, market 
activity remained strong, with volumes typically exceeding the drought-year levels, 
especially by the end of the decade.  The only dips in a generally upward trend in 
purchases occurred in the exceptionally wet years of 1995 and 1998, when many areas of 
the state experienced flooding.  The market is now a firmly established – if modest – 
feature of the state’s water allocation process, with annual trades at 1.2 million acre-feet, 
roughly 3 percent of combined agricultural, municipal, and industrial water use (CDWR, 
1998). 
Several characteristics of the market suggest that it has yet to realize its potential 
as a reallocation tool to meet changes in patterns of demand.  As expected, agricultural 
water districts are the main suppliers, providing at least 90 percent of volumes sold in 
4   most years.  By contrast, the demand side of the market has behaved somewhat counter-
intuitively.  Economists had anticipated that a market would develop primarily as a 
response to population growth and the ability of urban dwellers to pay more than 
agricultural users for water (Phelps et al., 1978; Vaux and Howitt, 1984).  Although cities 
were major buyers during the drought years, they have not participated in market growth 
since 1995.  
Figure 1.  Short and Long-term Water Transfers, 1985 - 2001 
Note:   The unusually high volume of total purchases in 1991 reflects the excess purchases by the 
the water bank. It was only able to resell about half of the 820,000 acre-




















































Source:  Hanak, 2002. 




vironmental regulations.  Direct state and federal purchases to support 
environmental programs have accounted for over one-third of the increase in p
since 1995. The other growth sector, accounting for over half of market expansion, has 
been agriculture in the San Joaquin Valley.  Farmers whose contractual water deliveries 
5   have been cut back by environmental mitigation programs have turned to the market for 
replacement water.
2 
The modest role of municipal demand reflects the predominantly short-term 
charact .  To 
 a recurring theme within 
Califor
Carter 
                                                
er of the market to date; 80 percent of all trades are based on annual contracts
support growth, many urban utilities are in search of long-term supply contracts.  Such 
transactions are more complex to negotiate, in part because of concerns within the 
agricultural source regions about potential third-party impacts. 
Concern over the lack of third-party protections has been
nia’s rural counties since the early 1990s water banks.
3  The banks’ two principal 
means of water acquisition were land fallowing and “groundwater substitution” – a 
method whereby water rights holders sell their surface water and pump additional 
groundwater for their own uses.  Both practices generated significant controversy (
et al., 1994). The fallowing issue came to a head during the 1991 water bank, for which 
over half the water was acquired through this method.  A number of local governments 
and businesses registered concerns about the consequences to local economies, and one 
county formally requested the state to reimburse costs of social welfare programs that it 
attributed to unemployment created by the water sales (Gray, 1994b).  Challenging both 
the legality of the claim and the facts on which it was based, the state declined the 
county’s request, but it also cut the fallowing program short. 
 
2 Sunding et al. (1997) anticipated that access to a market could significantly reduce the costs to farmers of 
these programs, which forcibly reallocated supplies from agriculture to instream environmental uses. 
3 The discussion in this section is based on sources noted as well as extensive interviews with local water 
users and officials in California’s rural counties conducted in the summer and autumn of 2002, reported in 
Hanak (2003, in press). 
 
6   In the 1992 and 1994 banks, water was purchased entirely from groundwater 
substitution and from the handful of suppliers in a position to sell excess water in surface 
storage.  A major controversy over groundwater substitution erupted in 1994, in a county 
where the state’s purchases were linked to neighboring wells going dry (Thomas, 2001).  
What began as a local issue quickly became a regional rallying point.  In effect, under the 
largely unregulated conditions of access to groundwater in rural California, there were 
fears that a water market could lead to groundwater being “mined,” with potentially dire 
consequences for local water users.  A notorious precedent was the large-scale export of 
groundwater from the Owens Valley in the Sierra Mountains to coastal Los Angeles 
beginning in the 1920s (Hundley, 2001).  This surreptitious transaction, which shut down 
the local agricultural economy and provoked major environmental damage, still looms 
large in the popular sentiment of rural California. 
Given the limited legal protections for groundwater users at the state level and the 
clear signal from the state and federal agencies that the water market was open for 
business, rural counties responded by putting in place their own restrictions on transfers.  
The legal device was the adoption of a groundwater protection ordinance, invoking the 
county’s police power to protect public health, safety, and welfare (Hanak and Dyckman, 
2003).  A handful of counties had already adopted such ordinances in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, in the wake of the last major drought and policy announcements from 
Sacramento favoring the development of a market.  The floodgates opened in 1994 when 
Tehama County won an appellate court victory, upholding counties’ rights to regulate 
this area given the limited state involvement.  As of 2002, 22 of the state’s 58 counties 
had adopted ordinances requiring county-level permits for direct and indirect 
7   groundwater exports to points outside the county.  Several of the ordinances explicitly 
regulate groundwater banking activities with outside parties; the remainder do so 
implicitly because the export restrictions do not distinguish between native groundwater 
and imported surface water banked in county aquifers. 
Geographically, the group with export ordinances is concentrated in the inland 
rural regions:  the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys to the center, the mountain 
counties to the north and east, and Imperial County to the south.  With the exception of 
the mountain counties, which have not participated in the statewide market, these are the 
water market’s main source regions. 
No comparable legal device was available to exert county-level control over 
fallowing for the water market.  Such transactions generally involve the export of surface 
water, over which the state has clear regulatory authority.  Moreover, there is no legal 
tradition in the United States for third-party protections against pecuniary externalities.  
In some counties, the ordinances nevertheless reflect a broader intent to discourage any 
type of transfer that might harm the local economy.
4  Some water districts – the local 
agencies that hold most water rights on behalf of individuals – have adopted anti-
fallowing policies.  Not surprisingly, this appears mainly to be a practice of districts 
whose boards are elected by the community at large, rather than by landowners only.  
The recent highly publicized controversy over a proposed long-term transfer from the 
Imperial Irrigation District (IID) to San Diego erupted when IID – whose board is 
popularly elected – was pressured to fallow despite district policy against the practice.  
Although landowner-run districts – which constitute more than half of all agricultural 
                                                 
4 This is the case in Fresno County, for instance, where officials have been discouraging long-term transfers 
of surface water contracts to parties outside the county even though no groundwater substitution is involved 
(Hanak, 2003, in press). 
8   water districts – have not been more active on the market overall, they appear to have 
been more likely to engage in fallowing-based sales.
5  
 
Market Impacts of Local Restrictions 
  To measure the effects of local resistance on the water market, we will focus on 
the role of county ordinances restricting exports.
6  Because the ordinances require one or 
several layers of environmental review prior to permitting, one possible effect would be 
to delay the pace of transactions.
7 However, a review of the permitting activity in 
counties with export restrictions suggests that the ordinances may more useful as a 
deterrent than as a screening mechanism.  As of late 2002, there had been fewer than 20 
permit applications and only one export permit granted. High up-front costs and the 
likelihood of negative public opinion guiding the decision process are both factors cited 
as discouraging parties from filing. 
If the ordinances are serving as deterrents, we might expect significant overall 
impacts on the volume of trades.  Most ordinances address both direct groundwater 
exports and any surface water exports resulting in additional groundwater extraction.  In 
counties with restrictions, the only types of transfers not subject to local approval are 
those involving water held in surface storage (available to few water purveyors), excess 
surface water (available mainly in very wet years, when demand is lower), water 
                                                 
5 Of the 176 agricultural water districts within the Central Valley that hold surface water rights, 63.5 
percent are landowner-run districts.  Although they hold an equivalent proportion of water rights, they have 
actually sold less water than popular-vote agricultural districts (2.3 million acre-feet versus 4.1 million 
between 1990 and 2001).  Precise data on the share of sales derived from fallowing is not available; Hanak 
(2003, in press) provides a review of the main transactions. 
6 Ideally, we would also have measured the extent to which water district fallowing restrictions have 
influenced market sales.  Although the anecdotal evidence of restrictions in popular-vote districts is highly 
suggestive, we do not have a systematic measure of which districts have adopted such restrictions. 
7 Colby (1995) found that delays in transfer approvals significantly increased as a function of the number of 
protests filed; such action was only available to parties legally authorized to dispute the transfers. 
9   conserved through efficiency gains (available only through investment outlays) or 
through land fallowing (available to farmers in some districts, at the expense of foregone 
crop income).  If the ordinances reflect a public view that out-of-county sales from any 
source should be discouraged, even these types of transfers could be affected. 
  Aggregate market impacts of two types might be expected.  In counties where 
there are willing buyers locally, the ordinances should shift supply from exports to in-
county uses (generally a lower-priced market).  In counties without local demand, or 
where the local demand is more limited than the potential supply, the ordinances should 
provoke an overall reduction in the volume traded.  The alternative prediction – of no 
effects on the volumes of total transfers and transfers leaving the county – would 
correspond to a scenario where the ordinances are generally ineffectual. 
Model and Data Sources 
The analysis focuses on the 12-year period beginning in 1990, the year in which 
data on counties of origin and destination become more precise. Two geographical 
groups are of interest.  The first is the set of 34 “water trading” counties – counties that 
appear at least once in the transactions database since 1990.  This excludes the mountain 
counties and counties along the north and central coast.  These non-trading counties are 
excluded for statistical reasons; the key econometric models cannot be estimated when 
they are included.
8  In many of these counties, there may be structural reasons for the lack 
of trading activity:  counties along the coast and to the far north rely on local river and 
                                                 
8 The inclusion of counties that never trade adds no information to the estimation of the effects of an export 
ordinance on trading behavior in a fixed-effects model.  The presence of many counties with all zero trades 
also complicates the estimation of a random-effects Tobit model.  For the state as a whole, the convergence 
properties of this model are not stable.  Regression results on the full state sample are, however, consistent 
with the findings we report below on the effects of the export ordinances and other key variables for the 34-
county sample. 
 
10   groundwater sources and are not hydraulically connected to the state’s main water 
arteries.  Some local trades may occur that we have not been able to trace with our 
sources. 
The second geographical group is the set of 18 Central Valley counties.  This 
region has been the major source of water for the market since the early 1990s.  It also 
has the greatest unrealized potential for groundwater-related transfer activity, through 
both groundwater substitution transfers and groundwater banking (Purkey, et al., 1998).  
The potential role of groundwater here stands in stark contrast to the situation in Imperial 
County, the other major market supplier.  Although this county imposed groundwater 
export restrictions in 1996, they are unlikely to have much practical influence on the 
overall volume of water sales.  Water users in this county have vast quantities of surface 
water rights form the Colorado River and, due to high salinity, few areas with usable 
groundwater. 
The model to be estimated considers county water sales and exports as a function 
of a set of variables capturing water supply conditions, agricultural and residential water 
demand within the county, and the institutional context for markets at the local and state 
level.  Summary statistics for these variables are presented in Table A.1. 
Water supply conditions are represented by two measures of county surface water 
supplies and a statewide measure of rainfall conditions.  Annual deliveries of project 
water from the three main surface water projects – the Central Valley Project, the State 
Water Project, and the Colorado River Project – are distinguished according to the 
seniority of the water rights.
9   The “senior rights” category includes those deliveries that 
take precedent under drought conditions.  The “junior rights” category includes the lower 
                                                 
9 The sources are CDWR and USBR.  For details see Hanak (2003, in press), Appendix D. 
11   priority deliveries to ordinary project contractors, typically much more variable from one 
year to the next.  In general, we would expect counties with higher water deliveries to be 
more active on the water market.  By the same token, individual counties should be more 
likely to sell in years when their deliveries are higher. 
Data on other water supplies – from local surface water projects and from 
groundwater – are not available.  We do have a general indicator of the quality of the 
water year, however, in the form of the state’s most important rainfall measure – the 
Sacramento Valley 40-30-30 index.
10  Since market demands and water prices are likely 
to be higher in dry years, we would expect this indicator to be negatively related to sales. 
Agricultural demand indicators include a measure of the average county-level 
price for annual crops (defined as all field and horticultural crops), the acreage under 
annual crops, and the share of perennial crops in total non-range acreage.
11  A priori, 
water sales should be inversely related to the average level of crop prices, which reflect 
the value of using water in agriculture.  Because farmers can make adjustments in annual 
crop acreages fairly easily as a function of water availability, water sales should be 
positively related a county’s crop acreage.  Conversely, because a higher share of tree 
crops in total acreage introduces less flexibility in water use, tree crop share should be 
negatively related to water sales. 
Residential water demands are represented by county population (CDOF, 2001).  
Other things equal, counties with higher populations should be less likely to sell water. 
                                                 
10 For a graphical presentation, see Figure 1. For details, see http://watsup2.water.ca.gov/hydrologic.cfm. 
11 All three series are constructed with data from the California Agricultural Statistics Service. The annual 
crop price is calculated using the county’s prior year output, valued at the statewide average price for the 
current year, deflated by the western states’ urban consumer price index.  Annual crop acreage includes all 
farm acreage except perennials and rangeland.  The share of tree crops is calculated as a percentage of total 
non-rangeland farm acreage.  Acreage measures are valued at the prior year levels, to account for the fact 
that decisions on water sales are generally made before final planting decisions. 
12   Institutional factors:  Local restrictions are captured by the presence of an export 
ordinance, beginning in the year of adoption.  In 1990, only two counties in the sample 
had ordinances; by 2000 the count was 12 for the 34-county sample and ten within the 
Central Valley.  In 2001 one county (Glenn) removed its restrictions in favor of a more 
comprehensive management scheme.  Over this same period, the state and federal 
agencies were introducing rules to make it easier for water districts to trade with each 
other.
 12   To capture this improved environment, we include a time trend in the 
regressions.  If the new operating rules are effectively increasing transfer activity, this 
variable should be positively related to sales.  A time trend also captures the effect of 
“learning-by-doing” by water users as they gain familiarity with the market. 
  Tobit models taking into account the panel structure of the data are the most 
appropriate specification for this problem, given the bunching of the distribution of the 
dependent variables at zero.
13 This specification nevertheless presents two limitations 
compared to a linear model.  The parameter estimates of the fixed-effects Tobit are 
potentially biased,
14 and there is no direct test of the appropriateness of the random- 
versus fixed-effects specification.  The results were therefore tested for robustness with a 
linear model, for which estimates correspond closely to those presented here.
15  Hausman 
specification tests of the linear model fail to reject the null hypothesis of no fixed effects 
                                                 
12 The most notable actions were the passage of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act in late 1992 
and the State Water Project’s Monterey Agreement in late 1994, both of which eased approval rules for 
trades among project contractors. 
13 For the 34-county sample, 31 percent of all sales and 39 percent of all exports are zero; for the Central 
Valley sample, the corresponding values are 11 and 18 percent, respectively 
14 This stems from the so-called “incidental parameters problem” (Arellano and Honoré, 2001).   
15 The fixed-effects Tobit models were estimated with Limdep 8.0.  All other models were estimated with 
Stata 7.0. 
13   at conventional levels of significance, suggesting the absence of omitted cross-sectional 
variables that would bias the random-effects Tobit results.
16 
Results 
Table 1 presents the effects of the two institutional variables – county restrictions 
and the state and federal trading environment – for all trading counties and for the Central 
Valley.  The county regulations have noticeably restricted market activity.  In the trading 
county sample, for which random- and fixed-effects coefficients are very close, the 
typical county with an export restriction sold over 14,000 acre-feet less than a county 
without one.  The estimated effect on exports is larger – at roughly 17,000 acre-feet – 
although the difference is not statistically significant.  These results suggest that the 
county restrictions have not only reduced sales, but have also resulted in some shifting of 
water from external to within-county buyers. 
There are some differences in the parameter estimates on county restrictions when 
the analysis is restricted to the Central Valley.  With the random-effects specification, 
export ordinances are estimated to reduce overall sales by nearly 21,000 acre-feet, and 
out-of-county sales by over 26,000 acre-feet.  The corresponding increase in local sales 
induced by ordinances is nearly 5,500 acre-feet per county per year.  In the fixed-effects 
specification, the effects are closer to the values for the full trading county sample.  
Although the random-effects and fixed-effects models are not different in a statistical 
sense, the different results for this one variable suggest that there may be some systematic 
differences within this sample between counties that have adopted ordinances and those 
that have not.  As we will discuss below, the pattern of ordinance adoption within the 
                                                 
16 The Hausman test statistics for the 34-county sample generate significance levels of 0.33 for water sales 
and 0.15 for water exports.  Corresponding values for the Central Valley sample are 0.58 and 0.52. 
14   Valley does reflect differences in the extent to which alternative forms of groundwater 
management are present in the county.  Most “non-adopters” have at least rudimentary 
forms of local oversight in place, which enabled water users to persuade county officials 
that an ordinance restricting exports was unnecessary. 
 
  Table 1. Market Effects of Institutional Factors, 1990-2001 
 Water  Sales Water  Exports 
 Tobit model:  Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects   Fixed Effects
        
34 Trading Counties         
County export restrictions  -14,308**  -14,935*  -16,948**  -17,690** 
   (7,246)  (7,769)  (7,722)  (8,453) 
State & federal policy (time trend)  3,828***  4,210***  3,729***  4,162*** 
   (681)  (914)  (761)  (1,016) 
18 Central Valley Counties         
County export restrictions  -20,789**  -14,893  -26,245***  -19,820** 
   (8,713)  (9,449)  (9,350)  (10,003) 
State & federal policy (time trend)  4,645***  3,984***  4,220***  3,292** 
   (977)  (1,348)  (1,039)  (1,428) 
 
Notes:  All models also include indicators of annual crop prices, annual crop area, share of tree crop area in 
total, population, junior and senior water project deliveries, rainfall, and a constant.   
Standard errors in parentheses. '***', '**', '*' indicate coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
99%, 95%, 90% levels of confidence in a two-way test.  For full model results, see Tables A.2 and A.3. 
 
To further explore the mechanisms by which county restrictions reduce water 
trades, we would ideally want to test whether the ordinances are affecting sales from 
groundwater-related sources alone or also those from water sources beyond their legal 
reach.  Because detailed information on water sources is unavailable, this proposition can 
only be tested indirectly.  To this end, a similar model was tested with binary dependent 
variables for sales and exports.  For both geographical samples, the export restrictions 
15   prove insignificant in explaining the likelihood of either action.
17   Thus, while the 
ordinances may exert a wider moral suasion effect against transfers in some counties, 
their main effect appears to be limited to groundwater-related sales. 
The aggregate market-dampening effects of export restrictions are nevertheless 
substantial.  Since 1996, the point at which a number of counties began to adopt 
ordinances, the restrictions have reduced exports by roughly 950,000 acre-feet, or 19 
percent of all out-of-county sales.
18  Of this total, 150,000 acre-feet that would otherwise 
have been exported have been sold locally.  The lion’s share (800,000 acre-feet) has 
simply been kept off the market.  In all, this represents a 14 percent reduction compared 
to the level of predicted sales in the absence of county restrictions.  For the Central 
Valley counties, these effects are even larger: a 39 percent reduction in exports and a 25 
percent reduction in overall sales due to restrictive ordinances.
19  The resulting shift from 
exports to the local market appears to have increased within-county sales by nearly 50 
percent. 
Meanwhile, state and federal measures to improve the trading environment plus 
learning, as measured by the time trend, have had a substantial positive effect on water 
sales.  The typical county was likely to sell roughly 44,000 acre-feet per year more in 
2001 than in 1990, under identical conditions of water supply and agricultural demand.  
During the first six years analyzed here, the positive effect of this improved environment 
(nearly 700,000 acre-feet) far outweighed the negative effect of county restrictions (under 
                                                 
17 Binary dependent variables for sales and exports were regressed on the set of independent variables 
reported in Tables A.2 and A.3 with random- and conditional fixed-effects logit estimators.  The only 
variables that are uniformly significant in determining the likelihood of sales and exports are rainfall levels 
and the time trend.  In the random-effects specification, crop area and crop prices are also significant and of 
the expected sign, reflecting the substantial cross-regional variability in agricultural conditions. 
18 The cumulative market effect was calculated by multiplying the number of counties affected by the 
average of the fixed- and random-effects per-county coefficients reported in Table 1. 
19 Results calculated with the random-effects coefficients reported in Table 1. 
16   250,000 acre-feet).
20  As the number of counties with restrictions has grown, this has 
ceased to be the case.  From 1996 to 2001, county restrictions cancelled out the positive 
effect of state and federal policies to encourage trade, at roughly 800,000 acre-feet each. 
Of the remaining variables in the supply equations, the group capturing water 
supply proved most significant in explaining county trading behavior (Tables A.2 and 
A.3).  In the random-effects specification, all three variables were significant and of the 
expected sign.  In the fixed-effects specification, the size of water deliveries to senior 
rights-holders had an unexpected negative impact on sales.  Upon reflection, this result is 
easily understood.  Although senior rights-holders experienced supply cuts during the 
early 1990s drought, the cuts were even more severe for other water users.  As such, 
senior rights-holders were some of the only players able to sell water in these years. 
Among the variables measuring agricultural and residential demand, only crop 
prices and crop acreage prove significant in the 34-county sample within the random-
effects framework.  Cross-sectional variability in the value of agricultural output is 
substantial – ranging from well over $300 per ton along the coast where farmers 
specialize in horticultural crops, to $100 per ton or less within the Central Valley, where 
field crops dominate.  By contrast, there has been relatively little variation over time in 
real average county prices during the period analyzed here.  A similar pattern emerges for 
area planted to annual crops, with little movement over time in average levels, but 
tremendous cross-county differences, ranging from close to a million acres in Fresno 
County to fewer than 50,000 acres along the coast.  The cross-county variability in both 
prices and area is much smaller within the Central Valley, which may explain why these 
                                                 
20 For method of calculation, see footnote 18. 




  Local resistance in source regions – manifested in county groundwater export 
restrictions and water district bans on crop fallowing – arose because of concerns over 
potential negative externalities from the water market and the absence of state-level 
protections.  The restrictions are having their intended effect of reducing market activity.  
They are likely to be sub-optimal measures to deal with market externalities, however, 
not only from a statewide perspective but also from the perspective of communities in the 
source regions.  Export bans limit the potential revenue streams from water sales, which 
can be beneficial to rural economies.  County groundwater ordinances also reduce the 
potential for communities to benefit from the development of new water supplies through 
underground storage.  What is the scope for introducing policies less restrictive of market 
development, while addressing third-party concerns?  The issues are distinct for the two 
types of harm that the market can inflict on communities – physical externalities 
associated with groundwater transfers and pecuniary externalities associated with land 
fallowing. 
 Groundwater Management Options to Address Physical Externalities 
Economic theory provides a clear principle for the solution to physical 
externalities such as those generated by groundwater-related transfers in California’s 
rural counties.  For an efficient outcome, some mechanism must be put in place to induce 
18   individuals to internalize the consequences of their own use of the resource.
21  County 
export restrictions can be viewed as a sensible stopgap measure to limit potential 
damages of an open-access groundwater system with the arrival of the water market.  The 
market did not create the problem of externalities – indeed, some areas were already 
subject to significant overdraft from local use – but it significantly increased the risk that 
groundwater supplies would be unavailable or costly in drought years when local needs 
were greatest.  In many places, the low level of knowledge about aquifer characteristics 
made it difficult to appreciate the extent of that risk.
22 
Export restrictions are nevertheless likely to be an inefficient mechanism, at once 
overly restrictive of transfer activity and ineffective in addressing the stability of the 
aquifer in areas already subject to overdraft. What are the policy options for moving 
beyond export restrictions to a more comprehensive management system? 
The economics literature has focused on the relative merits of alternative 
management schemes – assignment of private property rights versus imposition of central 
control (Provencher and Burt, 1994); use of price versus quantity mechanisms for 
allocation by a central authority (McCarl et al, 1999); choice among alternative regimes 
for selecting the level of a pump tax (Burness and Brill, 2001).  Underlying all of these 
options is the notion that some form of quantity- or price-based mechanism for limiting 
individual pumping behavior is a necessary component of efficient management. 
                                                 
21 A large literature focuses on whether the externalities associated with common property groundwater 
regimes are sufficiently large to warrant improved management methods (Provencher, 1995).  In the 
present context, we consider this issue moot.  As Provencher and Burt (1994) note, “…when political winds 
blow in the direction of groundwater management, it becomes purely academic to debate whether or not the 
groundwater resource should be managed…the relevant question for economists is…how to manage it.”  
22 For instance, within the northern part of the Central Valley, often considered an area with considerable 
surplus groundwater available for export, only three regional investigations of the aquifer systems had been 
completed in the past 80 years and none since the mid 1970s (Fulton et al., 2003). 
19   Most of the groundwater basins in urbanized southern California and in coastal 
areas are managed with variants of the mechanisms described in the literature (CDWR, 
2003).  In adjudicated basins, individual drawing rights are quantified and monitored by a 
water master.  In other areas, individuals have ceded their groundwater rights to a 
collective authority, which regulates use through a pumping fee.  These systems have 
been established through court orders and legislative actions since the 1940s and 1950s, 
in response to local concerns regarding the integrity of the resource base (Ostrom, 1990; 
Blomquist, 1992).
23    Whatever their relative merits, there is a consensus that these 
systems encourage improved management (CDWR, 2003); groundwater banking and 
recharge activities are common, as is participation in the water market. 
Rural water users have so far eschewed these more comprehensive management 
systems, in part due to cost considerations (a key argument against adjudication 
proceedings) and in part due to a desire to avoid ceding control to a central authority (and 
bearing the attendant pump taxes).  There is, nevertheless, a movement underway toward 
more active groundwater management.  In some places, the county itself or a special 
district with county-wide jurisdiction has played a convening role for county water users; 
in others, water districts overlying a shared basin have grouped together to develop a 
groundwater management plan (Hanak, 2003, in press). As noted earlier, most Central 
Valley counties that did not impose export restrictions made this choice because they 
already had at least rudimentary groundwater management systems in place.  One county 
has replaced an export ordinance with a more active groundwater management scheme.  
                                                 
23 Rather than the advent of a water market, population pressure and technical threats such as saltwater 
intrusion and land subsidence provided the impetus for introducing management schemes. 
20   The regression results indicate that water users in these counties have been more active 
on the market. 
These new management schemes share the objective of improving the knowledge 
base on the groundwater basins, through the establishment of monitoring networks, data 
analysis and in some cases modeling exercises. The most assertive programs have 
established procedures to mitigate harm to third parties from market-related activity, 
through compensation and potentially also cessation of pumping for export.  A key 
question is whether a strictly voluntary management principle is adequate, or whether 
some form of quantity- or price-based restrictions on individual pumping is needed for 
the programs to be effective.  Moving to more restrictive systems may be constrained by 
political feasibility. 
Another question concerns the appropriate role for the state vis-à-vis other actors 
in encouraging improved groundwater management.  Despite a recurring debate over 
whether the state should assert greater control over this resource,
24 current political 
realities dictate that management systems will need to be developed at the local level.  
There are also efficiency arguments to be made in favor of local control, because both 
monitoring and determination of local water demands is best done on a decentralized 
basis (Provencher and Burt, 1993 and 1994). But there is also a role for state-level 
support, given the wider public benefits of the market and of groundwater banking, which 
cannot proceed unless local management systems are established.  The state has been 
active in this regard, through technical and financial assistance, made available subject to 
local adoption of programs with sound content (CDWR, 2003). 
                                                 
24 Most recently, see the report to the State Water Resources Control Board by Joseph Sax  (2002) and the 
associated public hearings. 
21   In counties with export restrictions, parties with senior water rights have 
incentives to spearhead these more comprehensive management systems, because they 
stand to gain the most from market opening.  Judging from initial experiences in some 
counties that have taken the lead on these issues, making locals comfortable with 
groundwater-related exports may require actions beyond ensuring adequate protection for 
other groundwater users.  Recent transfers have been accompanied by “deal-sweeteners” 
in the form of bargain sales of surface water to local users in short supply.  This 
represents a wealth transfer to others in the community rather than a correction of a 
physical externality.  
Mitigating the Pecuniary Externalities of Land Fallowing 
  When local resistance to the market derives from concern over the economic 
impacts of land fallowing, the policy implications are less clear.  There is neither an 
efficiency justification nor a legal tradition for mitigating the impacts of pecuniary 
externalities. However, some scholars have argued that there are ethical grounds for 
doing so, since water marketing is a policy tool of the state, and since source regions tend 
to be economically disadvantaged (Young, 1986; NRC, 1992; Sax, 1994; Howe, 2000).  
There may also be practical reasons for doing so, in places where community resistance 
will otherwise block a transfer from going through. 
  Policy options for mitigating these types of impacts fall into three basic 
categories:  limiting the amount of land that can be fallowed locally, providing the 
community with a voice in the bargaining process, and establishing a scheme to 
compensate individuals for income lost as a result of land fallowing.  All three of these 
measures have been put to the test in California; none is devoid of problems. 
22   Restricting the amount of land to be fallowed within a given area will clearly 
reduce the market’s efficiency, wherever low-valued agricultural uses of water are 
geographically concentrated.  As Howitt (1994) showed in a study of the effects of the 
1991 water bank, moderate restrictions of this nature may nevertheless be a practical way 
of keeping the level of losses to local businesses within politically acceptable bounds.  
Soon after the 1991 water bank controversy, the California legislature amended the Water 
Code to incorporate a loose restriction on crop idling for the market.
25  Many water 
districts involved in such sales impose rules on individual farmers, such as limits on 
percentage of land to be idled and upkeep requirements for idled fields.  Such rules serve 
the dual purpose of maintaining the overall viability of cropland within the area and 
assuring the community (including other farmers) that selling water will not displace the 
primary business of farming. 
Giving the wider community a say in the matter of land fallowing for transfers 
could, in principle, allow for the full (local) social benefits of the transfer to be taken into 
account.  Colby (1995) has argued that mechanisms to incorporate third parties into the 
approval process can be beneficial for this reason.  There is a risk, of course, that the 
community will be overly conservative, blocking transfers that would make good sense 
not only for the farmers but also for the local economy.  In California, popular-vote 
districts automatically give the community this voice.  As noted, many of these districts 
have blanket policies against fallowing. 
  In the one major fallowing transaction that may be approved by a popular-vote 
district – the long-term transfer from IID to San Diego – much of the debate has centered 
                                                 
25 Under Cal. Water Code § 1745.05, fallowing-based sales exceeding 20 percent of a district’s acreage 
must be subject to public review (though not to formal public approval). 
23   on the third policy option of compensating injured parties.  Because this type of sale is 
theoretically Pareto-improving, such a policy could in principle allow mitigation without 
compromising efficiency.  For this reason, compensation – typically through the 
institution of a transfer tax – has been favored both by some economists (Howe et al., 
1990; Howitt, 2001) and some legal scholars (Sax, 1994; Gray, 1996).  
Theoretical merits notwithstanding, California’s recent experience underscores 
the considerable practical obstacles to implementing wealth transfers from winners to the 
third-party losers.
26  Mitigation funds have been established for two long-term sales of 
Colorado River water (IID to San Diego and Palo Verde Irrigation District to the 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California).  Both CDWR and Metropolitan have 
also set aside such funds for purchases of water under short-term fallowing contracts in 
the Sacramento Valley.  To date, the creation of these funds may have generated more 
controversy than it has resolved. 
At issue are both the size of the funds and the development of appropriate 
programs for their use.  For the short-term transfers, water districts and county 
governments involved in administering the funds have been reticent to establish direct 
compensation programs.  In part, this stems from a belief that some of the transfers will 
generate few, if any, damages that merit mitigation, given the highly mechanized nature 
of the crops being fallowed and farmers’ use of proceeds to reinvest in their land.  There 
are also concerns that a direct compensation program would establish a dangerous legal 
precedent, generate excessive claims, and ultimately create unrealistic expectations about 
                                                 
26 Using experimental methods, Howitt (2001) found that a transfer tax-based fund for paying third-party 
claims generates a highly efficient and stable outcome.  By assuming that a perfectly informed neutral 
arbitrator awards payments, the research avoided the problem of incentives for third parties to over-
estimate damages and file frivolous claims. 
24   the potential community benefits from water transfers.  One alternative – and the likely 
option in the Palo Verde case – is to use the funds for community development, without 
earmarking individual beneficiaries. 
Taken together, these cases will provide useful guidance on what types of 
mitigation policies are practical for future transfers in California and elsewhere in the 
West.  Requiring such mitigation through state law – proposed through several bills to the 
legislature since 1998 – would introduce inflexibility in an area where transacting parties 
are already testing solutions.
25   Table A.1.  Summary Statistics for Annual County Water Sales 
and Water Exports, 1990-2001 
 
  
34 trading counties 18 Central Valley 
counties 
All Sales (acre-feet)  22,734 31,461 
   (40,658)  (45,842) 
Incidence of Zero Sales  31 %  11 % 
       
Out-of-County Exports (acre-feet)  19,465 25,419 
   (39,075)  (44,140) 
Incidence of Zero Exports  39 %  18 % 
       
Ag & Residential Demand      
Annual Crop Prices ($/ton)  162  117 
   (126)  (51) 
Annual Crop Area (acres)  205,893  294,918 
   (226,721)  (230,010) 
Tree Crop Area in Total (%)  23.2  22.6 
   (19.7)  (13.9) 
Population 856,177  286,226 
   (1,602,147)  (292,132) 
Water Supply Conditions      
Project Deliveries (acre-feet)      
   - Senior rights  243,826  178,751 
   (537,918)  (210,645) 
   - Junior rights  179,474  247,412 
   (272,842)  (346,500) 
Rainfall Index  8.18  8.18 
   (3.18)  (3.18) 
      
County Export Restrictions  0.19 0.30 
(1 = restriction)  (0.39)  (0.46) 
       
Number of observations  408  216 
 
Notes:   mean values, standard deviations in parentheses 
26   Table A.2.  Determinants of Annual County Water Sales, 1990-2001: 
34 Water-trading Counties (acre-feet) 
 
 Water  Sales  Water Exports 
Tobit model:  Random Effects Fixed Effects  Random Effects   Fixed Effects
          
Ag & residential demand         
Annual crop prices ($/ton)    -75.8**  7.34  -88.9**  20.7 
   (33.0)  (73.48)  (38.4)  (87.9) 
Annual crop area (1,000 acres)   54.6**  99.5  37.6  -74.1 
   (23.1)  (106.6)  (27.2)  (122) 
Tree crop area in total (%)  -96.1  347.7  -113  -467 
   (220)  (947.5)  (254)  (1,111) 
Population (1,000)  -1.5  -11.6  -2.0  9.7 
   (2.6)  (41.4)  (3.0)  (46.5) 
Water supply conditions         
Project deliveries (1,000 acre-feet)         
   - Senior rights  23.8***  -162**  28.3***  -176** 
   (7.4)  (66.6)  (8.0)  (72.3) 
   - Junior rights  49.2***  62***  43.2***  57.3*** 
   (13.1)  (15)  (14.3)  (16.5) 
Rainfall index  -3,529***  -3,532***  -3,235***  -3,166*** 
   (749)  (758)  (831)  (844) 
Institutional factors         
County export restrictions  -14,308**  -14,935*  -16,948**  -17,690** 
   (7,246)  (7,769)  (7,722)  (8,453) 
State & federal policy (time trend)  3,828***  4,210***  3,729***  4,162*** 
   (681)  (914)  (761)  (1,016) 
          
Log-likelihood -840  -793  -787  -737 
 
Notes:  All models include a constant.  Standard errors in parentheses. '***', '**', '*' indicate coefficient is 
significantly different from zero at the 99%, 95%, 90% levels of confidence in a two-way test. 
Log-likelihoods reported for regressions with dependent variable scaled in 10,000 acre-feet, necessary for 
estimating the fixed-effects model. 
 
27   Table A.3.    Determinants of Annual County Water Sales, 1990-2001: 
18 Central Valley Counties (acre-feet) 
 
 Water  Sales  Water Exports 
 Tobit model:  Random Effects  Fixed Effects  Random Effects  Fixed Effects
           
Ag & residential demand          
Annual crop prices ($/ton)    -71.8  -92.1  -139  -161 
   (87.7)  (129.5)  (102)  (154) 
Annual crop area (1,000 acres)   11.0  219*  -30.7  42.2 




Tree crop area in total (%)  289  296  409  -329 
   (364)  (1,656)  (408)  (1,792) 
Population (1,000)  -18.5  124  -10.3  245 
   (21.6)  (167)  (23.7)  (182) 
Water supply conditions         
Project deliveries (1,000 acre-feet)         
   - Senior rights  -7.2  -117.5  -10.9  -119 
   (25.6)  (75.9)  (29.0)  (80.4) 
   - Junior rights  64.0***  72.2***  58.6***  61.2*** 
   (15.4)  (17.4)  (16.4)  (18.5) 
Rainfall index  -5,410***  -5,524***  -4,661***  -4,534*** 
   (1,049)  (1,069)  (1,109)  (1,134) 
Institutional factors         
County export restrictions  -20,789**  -14,893  -26,245***  -19,820** 
   (8,713)  (9,449)  (9,350)  (10,003) 
State & federal policy (time trend)  4,645***  3,984***  4,220***  3,292** 
   (977)  (1,348)  (1,039)  (1,428) 
          
Log-likelihood; Overall R
2 -553  -528  -534  -509 
 
Notes:  All models include a constant.  Standard errors in parentheses. '***', '**', '*' indicate coefficient is 
significantly different from zero at the 99%, 95%, 90% levels of confidence in a two-way test. 
Log-likelihoods reported for regressions with dependent variable scaled in 10,000 acre-feet, necessary for 
estimating the fixed-effects model. 
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